Do Differences in School's Instruction Time Explain International Achievement Gaps in Maths, Science and Language? Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries by Victor Lavy
CEE DP 118 
 
Do Differences in School's Instruction Time Explain 
International Achievement Gaps in Maths, Science 


















ISSN 2045-6557Published by 
Centre for the Economics of Education 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
© V. Lavy, submitted September 2010 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be 
sent to the editor at the above address. 
 
The  Centre for  the  Economics  of  Education  is an  independent  multidisciplinary  research 
centre. All errors and omissions remain the authors.  Do Differences in School's Instruction Time Explain 
International Achievement Gaps in Maths, Science 






1.  Introduction                  1 
2.  Empirical Strategy                 4 
3.  Data                      7 
4.  Results                    11 
  Estimates of the effects of instructional time in OECD countries   11 
  Robustness of main results and checks for threats of identification  12 
  Heterogeneous treatment effects            16 
  Evidence from middle and low income countries        16 
  Evidence from primary and middle schools in Israel      18 
5.  Correlates of Productivity Differences of Instructional Time across 
Countries                    21 
6.   Conclusions                   23 
References                      25 
Tables                      27 





Victor Lavy is the William Haber Chaired Professor of Economics at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Chaired Professor of Economics at Royal Holloway, University of London and an 
Associate of the Centre for the Economics of Education. 1  
  
                                                
1            Introduction  
There are large differences across countries in instructional time in public schooling institutions. 
For example, among European countries such as Belgium, France and Greece, pupils aged 15 have an 
average of over a thousand hours per year of total compulsory classroom instruction while in England, 
Luxembourg and Sweden the average is only 750 hours per year.
1 For children aged 7-8 in England, 
Greece, France and Portugal average instructional time is over 800 hours per year while in Finland and 
Norway it is less than 600 hours. Similar differences among countries exist in the number of classroom 
lessons per week in different subjects as evident from the PISA 2006 data. For example, pupils aged 15 
in Denmark are exposed to 4 hours of instruction per week in math and 4.7 in language, while pupils of 
the same age in Austria have only 2.7 hours of weekly classroom lessons in math and 2.4 in language. 
Overall, total weekly hours of instruction in math, language and science is 55 percent higher in Denmark 
(11.5 hours) than in Austria (7.4 hours). Similar magnitudes of disparities in instructional time are 
observed among the Eastern European and developing countries that are included in PISA 2006. Can 
these large differences explain some of the differences across countries in pupils’ achievements in 
different subjects? What is the likely impact of changes in instructional time? This later question is of 
policy relevance in many countries, for example, it became very concrete recently in the US as 
President Barrack Obama argued that American children should go to school longer, either to stay later 
in the day or into the summer. He announced the objective of extending the school week and year as a 
central element in his proposed education reform for the US.
2   
The simple correlations and the simple OLS regression relationship between classroom 
instructional time per week and test scores of pupils aged 15 in the 2006 PISA exams in math, science 
and language are positive and highly significant. Of course, these correlations do not represent causal 
relationships because of potential selection and endogeneity. In this paper, I investigate the causal 
relationship between instructional time and pupils' knowledge in these subjects. While research in recent 
 
1  Source: OECD Education at Glance, 2006:  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/47/37344903.xls. 
2  President Barrack Obama said  recently (March 10, 2009, at a speech to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce) that American children should go to school longer — either stay later in the day or into the summer — 
if they're going to have any chance of competing for jobs and paychecks against foreign kids. He said “We can no 
longer afford an academic calendar designed when America was a nation of farmers who needed their children at 
home plowing the land at the end of each day. That calendar may have once made sense, but today, it puts us at a 
competitive disadvantage. Our children spend over a month less in school than children in South Korea. That is no 
way to prepare them for a 21st Century economy. The challenges of a new century demand more time in the 
classroom. If they can do that in South Korea, we can do it right here in the United States of America." He urged 
administrators to "rethink the school day" to add more class time. He proposed longer class hours as part of a 
broader effort to improve U.S. schools that he said are falling behind foreign competitors. "Despite resources that 
are unmatched anywhere in the world, we have let our grades slip, our schools crumble, our teacher quality fall 
short, and other nations outpace us," Obama said. "In 8th grade math, we've fallen to 9th place. Singapore's middle-
schoolers outperform ours three to one. Just a third of our 13- and 14-year olds can read as well as they should.”  2  
  
                                                
years provides convincing evidence about the effect of several inputs in the education production 
function
3, there is limited evidence on the effect of classroom instructional time. This evidence can be 
very important for policy because it is relatively simple to increase instructional time, provided resources 
are available, and there is much scope for such an increase in many countries.  In the last section of the 
paper I also examine what factors can explain part of the variation across countries in the marginal 
productivity of classroom instructional time. I focus in this analysis on structural features such as 
accountability, autonomy and governance of schools.    
I use two sources of data in this study. The first are the results of the PISA 2006. PISA is a 
triennial survey of the knowledge and skills of 15-year-olds. It is the product of collaboration between 
participating countries through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and draws on leading international expertise to develop valid comparisons across countries and cultures. 
More than 400,000 students from 57 countries constituting close to 90% of the world economy took part 
in PISA 2006. The study focused on science but the assessment also included language and mathematics 
and collected data on student, family and institutional factors, including information about the amount of 
instructional time per week in each of the subjects tested. The second source of data is a testing and 
survey program of 5
th and 8
th grade pupils in Israel in 2002-2005 in math, science, English and Hebrew. 
These two sources of administrative data have two key features that I exploit to identify the effect of 
instructional time on academic achievement. Firstly, both data sets include test scores in multiple subjects 
for each student, and there is relatively large variation in instructional time across subjects. This allows 
me to use within student estimation of the effect of instructional time while controlling for individual 
time invariant characteristics that equally affect performance across subjects such as the individual’s 
underlying ability, parental and family background, lagged achievements and lagged and current school 
resources and characteristics. Secondly, there is considerable within student variation in instructional 
time. For example, among the OECD developed countries, the minimum mean 
3classroom instructional 
time in math is 2.4 hours per week in the Netherlands and the maximum is 4.2 in Iceland. The respective 
figures in science are 1.8 in the Netherlands and 3.6 in New Zealand, while in language they are 2.4 in 
Austria and 4.7 in Germany. I use this significant variation to test whether the effect of instructional time 
is non-linear and whether it differs among developed and developing countries. The disadvantage of this 
identification approach is that I assume that the effect of instructional time is the same for all three 
subjects. This assumption is common in many studies that pool cross sectional data across subjects. 
 
3 For example, studies on class size (e.g. Angrist and Lavy, 1999, Kruger 1999, Hoxby 2000), teachers’ training 
and certification (Angrist and Lavy, 2001, Kane Rockoff and Staiger, 2007), remedial education (Jacob and 
Lefgren, 2004, Lavy and Schlosser, 2005), teacher effect (Rockoff, 2004, Rivkin, Hanushek, and  Kain, 2005), 
computer aided instruction (Angrist and Lavy. 2002, Barrow, Markman and Rouse, 2009), students’ incentives 
(Angrist.J, P. Lang, and P. Oreopoulos, 2009, Angrist and Lavy,  2009), teachers’ incentives (Lavy, 2009).  3  
  
However, in this study I can assess how restrictive it is by comparing estimates obtained based on 
pooling only sub-groups or all three or four subjects together.  
The use of the data from Israel provides evidence for different age groups than the PISA data, 
and it has the additional advantage of offering longitudinal data based on following pupils from fifth to 
8
th grade. Although this is possible only for a sub-sample of students (for whom I can link their records in 
2002 and 2005), these data permit identification based on a student fixed effect due to a change in 
instructional time over time. Another advantage to using the Israeli data is that it permits estimation of 
the effect for each subject separately, based on within-pupil variation, while with the OECD data it is 
only possible to use the within-pupil variation by pooling together some or all subjects.        
  There are numerous studies about the effect of time spent in school on student achievement and 
earnings. For example, Grogger (1996), and Eide and Showalter (1998), estimated the effect of the length 
of the school year in the US and found insignificant effects, perhaps due to limited variation in this 
variable across schools or also due to correlated omitted variables. Rizzuto and Wachtel (1980), Card and 
Krueger (1992), and Betts and Johnson (1998) used State level data in the US to examine the same effect 
and found a positive significant effect on earnings, perhaps because they study earlier periods where 
there was more variation in length of the school year and because the effect of unobserved heterogeneity 
may also be less of an issue with state level data.  Card and Krueger also present results controlling for 
state effects. The positive effect of year length vanishes within states and conditional on other school 
quality variables. Lee and Barro (2001) examine the effect of the amount of time spent in school during 
the year on student performance across countries while controlling for a variety of measures for school 
resources.  They find no effects of the length of the school year on internationally comparable test scores. 
A more recent study by Wößmann (2003), which also analyzes cross-country test score data, 
corroborates this finding. He finds a significant effect of instructional time, but the size of the effect is 
negligible. However, these two studies attempt to identify the effect of instructional time on test scores 
by controlling for many characteristics and resources in each school and country. This method cannot 
rule out biases (due to school and country unobserved heterogeneity) that are correlated with 
instructional time and test scores.  A more recent study, Pishke (2007), overcomes potential selection and 
endogeneity problems by using the variation introduced by the West-German short school years in 1966-
67 as a natural experiment, which exposed some students to a total of about two thirds of a year less of 
schooling while enrolled. The study reports that the short school years increased grade repetition in 
primary school, and led to fewer students attending higher secondary school tracks. On the other hand, 
the short school years had no adverse effect on earnings and employment later in life. Two other recent 
studies exploit for identification variation in school day cancelations due to snow and changes in testing 4  
  
dates. Hansen (2008) use data from two states in the US (Colorado and Maryland) and report that more 
instructional time prior to test administration increases student performance. Marcotte and Hemelt 
(2008) investigates the reduced form relationship between yearly snowfall and test scores, finding years 
with substantial snowfall are associated with lower performance in Maryland. 
The results I present in the paper show that instructional time has a positive and significant effect 
on the academic achievements of pupils but the estimates are much lower than the ‘naïve’ OLS estimates 
which overstate the extent to which countries like the US might “catch up” to other developed nations by 
increasing instructional time. The within country within pupil analysis derived both from the 2006 PISA 
data of pupils aged 15 and the Israeli data of pupils in 5
th and 8
th grade yields consistent results. The size 
of the estimated effects is modest to large. On average an increase of one hour of instruction per week in 
math, science or language raises the test score in these subjects by 0.15 of a standard deviation of the 
within student distribution of test scores. The size of the effect is larger for girls, for pupils from low 
socio economic status families and for immigrants. Estimates based on the sample of the former Soviet 
block eastern European countries are very similar to the average effect obtained from the sample of 
OECD developed countries. The evidence based on a sample of developing countries suggests a much 
lower effect of instructional time on test scores, on average one additional instructional hour improves 
test scores by 0.075 standard deviation of the within pupil test score distribution. In similarity to the 
OECD results, the effect is much larger for girls, for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds and for 
immigrants. Overall, the main results presented in the paper are very robust to a variety of robustness 
checks with respect to the identification assumptions and to threats to their validity. The evidence from 
Israel add to the credibility of the results based on the PISA data as they yield very similar estimates of 
the effect of instructional time on pupil achievements. The estimates are consistent across primary and 
middle schools and across the various methods of identification and estimation.   
  In the second part of the paper, I investigate whether the estimated effect of instructional time 
varies by certain characteristics of the labor market for teachers and of the school environment. I use 
information from PISA 2006 about school accountability measures and the degree of school autonomy 
such as the role of schools in hiring and firing teachers and in determining wages of teachers. The main 
effects of these characteristics, which vary by school, are absorbed in the estimation by the school fixed 
effect but I am able to estimate the effect of their interactions with instructional time in each subject. The 
evidence suggest that the productivity of instructional time is higher in schools that operate under well 
defined accountability measures, and in schools that enjoy extensive autonomy in budgetary decisions 
and in hiring and firing teachers. 5  
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the identification strategy. 
Section 3 discusses the data, the construction of the analysis samples, and presents various pieces of 
evidence that assess the validity of the identification strategy. Section 4 reports the pupil cross section 
fixed effects estimates of the effect of instructional time in each subject using the three international 
samples of countries, while section 5 presents evidence based on Israeli data. Section 6 shows results 
about the correlations of the average productivity of instructional time with schools and teachers’ labor 
market characteristic. Section 7 concludes. 
  2           Empirical Strategy 
The effects of unobserved correlated factors usually confound the effect of instructional time on 
students’ outcomes. Such correlations could result if self-selection and sorting of students across schools 
are affected by school resources or if there is a correlation between school instructional time and other 
characteristics of the school that may affect students’ outcomes. One possible method to account for both 
sources of confounding factors in the estimation of instructional time is to rely on within-student 
variations in instructional time across various subjects of study. Based on this approach, I examine 
whether differences in a student between subjects are systematically associated with differences between 
subjects in instructional time. The basic idea for identification is that the student’s characteristics, ability, 
and the school environment are the same for all three subjects except for the fact that some subjects have 
more instructional time than the other subjects do. Of course, it could be that at the school level, such 
variation is not purely random but the cause of such selection across schools is constant for each student 
in school and therefore does not vary within each student. Based on this approach I present within 
student estimates of the effect of instructional time on individual test scores using the following panel 
data specification, 
   Aijk =μi + γ Hkj + β Xij + δ S j + (ε j +ηk) + uijk      ( 1 )  
Where Aijk is the achievement of the i
th student, in the j
th school, in the k
th subject, Hkj is instructional time 
in the k
th subject in the j
th school, X is a vector of characteristics of the i
th student in the j
th school and Sj is 
a vector of characteristics of the j
th school. εj  and ηk represent the unobserved characteristics of the 
school and the subject, respectively, and uijk is the remaining unobserved error term. The student fixed 
effect μi captures the individual’s family background, underlying ability, motivation, and other constant 
non-cognitive skills. Note that by controlling for this individual fixed effect, using within-student across 
subjects' variation in test scores, I also control for the school fixed effect ε j. Therefore, exploiting within-
student variation allows for the controlling of a number of sources of potential biases related to 
unobserved characteristics of the school, the student or their interaction. Firstly, students might be placed 6  
  
                                                
or be sorted according to their ability across schools that provide more (less) instructional time in some 
subjects. If, for example, more able students attend better schools who provide more instructional hours 
overall in each subject, it would cause γ to be downward biased unless the effect of student and school 
fixed effects are accounted for. The bias will have an opposite sign if the less able students are exposed 
to more instructional time. Identification of the effect of instructional time based on a comparison of the 
performance of the same student in different subjects is therefore immune to biases due to omitted school 
level characteristics, such as resources, peer composition and so on, or to omitted individual background 
characteristics, such as parental schooling and income.
4  
  I should make here three important remarks about this identification strategy. First, the necessary 
assumption for this identification strategy is that the effect of instructional time is the same for all 
subjects, implying that γ cannot vary by subject. Although this restriction is plausible, in the analysis that 
follows I will provide some evidence to support this conjecture. Second, the effect of instructional time is 
‘net’ of instructional time spillovers across subjects, (e.g. instruction time in language might influence 
pupils’ test scores in Mathematics). Third, the pupil fixed effect framework does not preclude the 
possibility that pupils select or are sorted across schools partly based on subject-specific instructional 
time. Stated differently, pupils who are high ability, for example, in math may select or be placed in a 
school that specialize in math and have more instructional time in math. This concern may be less 
relevant in the sample that I use for two reasons. First, such tacking is mostly within schools and I 
measure instructional time in each subject by the school level means and not by the class means or even 
the within school program level means. Secondly, the pupils in the sample are age 15 and therefore most 
are still in 9
th grade. In most countries, 9
th grade is part of middle school or lower secondary school while 
schools that specialize in a given subject are mostly upper secondary schools, from 10
th grade on. 
Moreover, I am able to stratify the sample according to good proxies of whether the school sorts and 
selects students based on subject specific considerations. For example, I observe in the PISA data 
information of whether the school considers for admission the student's academic record, whether the 
school considers for admission the student’s need or desire for a special program, whether it uses 
tracking in forming classes and whether it is a public or a private school. I assume that a school that do 
not use academic ability as criterion for admission or that in this process it does not take into account 
student’s desire for a particular program, will most likely not select students on subject specific 
considerations. Such selection is also less likely to take place in schools that do not use any form of 
 
4 Since the treatment variable, instructional time, is measured at the school level, the error term, uijk, is clustered by 
school to capture common unobservable shocks to students at the same school.  
 
 7  
  
tracking by ability, or in public schools. Indeed, the results that I present below are very similar across 
the various stratified samples based on schools admission and tracking policies and on whether they are 
private or public.  
I also address the issue of subject specific selection based on the Israeli data. First, by first using 
data at the primary school where there is not at all any kind of sorting by subject specific pupil’s ability 
or subject specific specialization. Second, by using panel data that allows to account for such sorting by 
controlling for lagged test scores in primary school (5
th grade) of all subjects in the within-pupil 
estimation. The identifying assumption here is that the lagged test scores in each subject effectively 
capture any unobserved heterogeneity that lead to sorting into school according to subject specific 
considerations such as expected school hours of instruction in a given subject. I can control for lagged 
test scores in a very flexible way by including in the specification at the same time same-subject lagged 
test scores (e.g. looking at 8
th grade English test score for pupil i controlling for his/her 5
th grade English 
achievement), as well as cross-subject test scores (e.g. looking at pupil i’s 8
th grade English test score 
controlling for his/her 5
th grade test score in Mathematics). Additionally, I can interact lagged test scores 
with subject-specific dummies, so that 5
th grade achievements can exhibit different effects on 8
th grade 
outcomes in different subjects. The specific specification that I use in this context is presented in section 4. 
  
3           Data 
  PISA is an acronym for the "Program for International Student Assessment".  It provides regular 
data on the knowledge and skills of OECD country students and education systems. The first survey was 
in 2000, the second in 2003 and the third in 2006. More than 60 countries have taken part in PISA so far 
and it is the only international education survey to measure the knowledge and skills of 15-year-olds, an 
age at which students in most countries are nearing the end of their compulsory time in school. Rather 
than examine mastery of specific school curricula, PISA looks at students’ ability to apply knowledge 
and skills in key subject areas and to analyze, reason and communicate effectively as they examine, 
interpret and solve problems. PISA measures student performance in language, mathematics and science 
literacy and asks students about their motivations, beliefs about themselves and learning strategies. All 
OECD member countries participated in the first three PISA surveys, along with certain partner 
countries. In total, 43 countries took part in PISA 2000, 41 in PISA 2003 and 58 in PISA 2006. Countries 
who are interested in participating in PISA contact the OECD Secretariat. The PISA Governing Board 
then approves membership according to certain criteria. Participating countries must have the technical 
expertise necessary to administer an international assessment and must be able to meet the full costs of 8  
  
participation. To take part in a cycle of PISA, countries must join two years before the survey takes 
place.  
  Each OECD country participating in PISA has a representative on the PISA Governing Board, 
appointed by the country’s education ministry. Guided by the OECD’s education objectives, the Board 
determines the policy priorities for PISA and makes sure that these are respected during the 
implementation of each PISA survey. For each survey, an international contractor (usually made up of 
testing and assessment agencies) has been responsible for the survey design and implementation. 
Working with the OECD Secretariat, the PISA Governing Board and the international contractor, the 
PISA National Project Managers oversee the implementation of PISA in each participating country. 
PISA has Subject Matter Expert Groups for its three key areas of testing – language, mathematics and 
science literacy – as well as for other subjects when appropriate (problem solving in PISA 2003, for 
example). These groups include world experts in each area. They design the theoretical framework for 
each PISA survey.  
  The international contractor randomly selects schools in each country. The tests are administered 
to students who are between 15 years 3 months and 16 years 2 months of age at the time of the test, 
rather than to students in a specific year of school. This average age of 15 was chosen because at this age 
young people in most OECD countries are nearing the end of compulsory education. The selection of 
schools aims to be representative of the respective population of schools and students. To date, PISA has 
used pencil-and-paper tests. The tests are made up of both multiple-choice questions and questions 
requiring students to construct their own responses. The material is organized around texts and 
sometimes includes pictures, graphs or tables setting out real-life situations. Each PISA survey includes 
about seven hours of test material. From this, each student takes a two-hour test, with the actual 
combination of test materials different for every student. All PISA countries are invited to submit 
questions to the international contractor; in addition, the international contractor also writes some 
questions. The questions are reviewed by the international contractor and by participating countries and 
are carefully checked for cultural bias. Only those questions that are unanimously approved are used in 
PISA.  
  Students answer a background questionnaire, providing information about themselves, their 
attitudes to learning and their homes. It takes 20-30 minutes to complete. In addition, school principals 
are given a 20-minute questionnaire about their schools.  
  Each country has its own group of test markers, overseen by the country’s National Project 
Manager. They mark the PISA tests using a guide developed by the international contractor and the PISA 
Subject Experts (with input from all participating countries). Other experts crosscheck the corrections. 9  
  
The results are then sent to the international contractor, who in turn transmits the final data to the OECD 
Secretariat. The average score among OECD countries is 500 points and the standard deviation is 100 
points. The results from PISA can be compared across the surveys, as can some of the background 
questionnaire items. 
  Table 1 reports the distribution of instructional time in each of the three international samples of 
countries in the 2006 PISA based on the pupil level data. Each pupil replied to the following question 
(see on line appendix for the exact format of this question in the PISA 2006 student’s questionnaire): 
“How much time do you typically spend per week studying the following subjects in regular lessons in at 
school?” The student could choose from the following options: No time, Less than 2 hours a week, 2 or 
more but less than 4 hours a week, 4 or more but less than 6 hours a week, or more hours a week. I 
merged the first two options into one as less than two hours a week and used the other categories as is. I 
computed the school average in each subject using the mid values of each range. Two remark about the 
accuracy of these instruction time measures. Since the PISA data allows to compute overall instruction 
time per week in all subjects together, I have aggregated and averaged this information at the country 
annual level for all OECD countries and the correlation of these country means with the administrative 
data on total annual hours of instruction in secondary schooling reported in the OECD report Education 
at Glance is very high. Second, the analysis with the Israeli data for primary and middle school is based 
on administrative data of instruction time. As will be shown below the results based on this data are very 
much in line with the evidence based on PISA 2006 data.  
The means of instructional time in the developed OECD countries in math, science and language 
are 3.53, 3.06 and 3.54 hours, respectively. In the Eastern European’s sample mean instructional time in 
math are 3.30, in science 2.77 and in language 3.08, lower than in the OECD countries in all subjects. 
Mean instructional time in the sample of developing countries is similar to the means in the Eastern 
Europe sample, math - 3.48, science - 2.97 and language - 3.24. Surprisingly, the respective means of 
instructional time in four new-industrialized East Asian countries, Macao-China, Korea, Hong Kong and 
Chinese Taipei, are much higher, and they are similar to the means of the developing countries sample.   
  Tables A1-A3 in the online appendix present the mean instructional time in each of the subjects 
for each of the countries included in the three samples of the 2006 PISA. As discussed in the introduction 
there is large variation across countries in each of the three groups of countries. There also large 
variation within countries across subjects and as a result a significant proportion of the overall variation 
in instruction time is due to the variation within countries between schools (evidence not shown here but 
available from the author). A key question of course is how are decisions about instructional time made. 
It is probably a fairly complex process that will vary both across and within nations. One potential factor 10  
  
explaining this variation that we can explore based on the PISA data is variation due to the variation in 
total instruction time per week over all subjects of study in school. The question about instruction time 
provides us with information about regular lessons in other subjects so that adding this with instruction 
time in math, science, and language sums up to total weekly instruction time in school. Apparently, large 
part of the variation across subjects in instruction time is explained by variation across schools in total 
instruction time per week. The variation in total weekly instruction time across schools originates 
naturally from many sources, for example differential government resource allocation to schools by their 
socio-economic background, differential contribution from parents and the community of local school 
authority and more. Much of these factors vary at the school or country level and our identification 
methodology will account for them because of the within school and pupil estimation strategy. It is also 
important to note in this regard that the PISA sample in each country includes 9th and 10
th grade students 
and the curriculum of study at this age in most or all countries is completely compulsory. It is only at the 
latter part of high school, perhaps at 11
th and 12
th grade that students get to choose some of their 
coursework. Therefore the variation in subject instruction hours across students in the same school is not 
due to an endogenous decision of pupils though it could be due to tracking practices in schools. We will 
examine directly how sensitive are our results to differences in tracking practices across schools. It is 
also important to note again  that the measure of instruction time in each subject is the average in the 
school and not the hours reported by each student. Another important comment about the measure of 
instruction time is that its weekly time dimension is not a limitation for the purpose I use it here, again 
because of the within pupil estimation strategy that I adopt in this study. There are as noted in the 
introduction differences across countries in the length of the school year (number of weeks of study) but 
this is a fix factor that is the same for all schools in the country and for all four subjects which is netted 
out in the within estimation strategy.    
Tables A1-A3 in the online appendix present as well the country means of the test scores in each 
of the subjects for each of the countries. PISA assesses how far students near the end of compulsory 
education have acquired knowledge and skills tin reading, mathematical and scientific literacy, not 
merely in terms of mastery of the school curriculum, but also in terms of important knowledge and skills 
needed in adult life. In Table A4 in the online appendix, I present the means of the test score and the 
instruction time variables for all three samples of countries. The average test score in the developed 
OECD countries is 513.4, the standard deviation in test scores between pupils is 84.4, and most relevant 
for our analysis, the within student standard deviation in test scores is almost half as large, 38.8. In short, 
there is considerable variation in test scores within the same pupil to explain. The average instructional 
time per subject in the OECD sample is 3.38 hours, and the within pupil standard deviation in 11  
  
instructional time is 1.02 — comparable in magnitude to the standard deviation in instructional time 
between students, 1.08. The rest of Table A4 in the online appendix presents the evidence for the Eastern 
Europe and developing countries samples. No dramatic differences are observed in the within and 
between pupil standard deviations of these two samples in comparison to the OECD sample.  
   4           Results 
 Estimates of the effects of instructional time in OECD countries 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients of instructional time from subject specific test scores 
regressions based on the sample of the OECD countries. For each subject I report estimates from three 
specifications: firstly without any controls, secondly with country fixed effects and thirdly with country 
fixed effects and pupil characteristics. The first row presents the OLS estimates when instructional time 
is measured in hours per week. The following two rows report estimates when three indicators, one for 
each for the following groups, measure instructional time: less than 2 hours per week, 2-3 hours per 
week, and 4+ hours. The first group indicator is the omitted group in the regression.  
The estimated effects of instructional time presented in Table 2 are all positive, very large, 
always significantly different from zero and not dramatically sensitive to the addition of controls to the 
regression. For example, the estimate for total instructional time in mathematics is 21.69 with no 
controls, 27.98 with country fixed effects and 24.45 with the addition of student’s controls. In science, 
the respective estimates are about 25-30 percent higher than in math. The language estimates are much 
lower than in math and science. The estimates of the instructional time’ indicators presented in panel II 
show that the largest marginal effect of one additional hour of instruction is when classroom hours are 
increased from less than 2 hours to 2-3 hours. In math for example, such a change is associated with an 
increase in test scores of about 0.5 of the standard deviation (s.d) of between pupils test score distribution 
and more than a standard deviation of the within pupils test score distribution. We will see below that the 
OLS estimates are highly biased upward.          
Column 1 in Table 3 presents estimates from regressions based on a pooled sample of all three 
subjects (with subject fixed effects included as controls) while column 2 presents estimates when student 
fixed effects are included.  The OLS estimates in column 1 are very similar to the estimates presented in 
Table 2. The within-student estimates in column 2 are all positive and much smaller than the OLS 
estimates in column 1 but they are still very precisely measured. Assuming a constant linear effect of 
instructional time, the effect of one additional hour of classroom instruction in the within student 
regression is 5.76 points. The effect amounts to 0.15 of the standard deviation within pupil and 0.07 
standard deviation of the between pupil test score distribution. However, the more relevant scale for the 12  
  
                                                
effect size is the within pupil standard deviation as this is the variation that we use to estimate the effect 
of instructional time in the within pupil regression.  
The estimates of the instructional time’ indicators suggest some non-linearity in the effect of 
instructional time, with a larger effect in the range of 1-2 hours than at higher levels. The marginal effect 
of an hour in the 2-3 hour range is 4.20 [= (6.3 points/1.5 hours)], while in the range of 4+ hours the 
effect is only 2.48  [= (12.42 points/5 hours)], both of which are lower than the average effect of 5.76 
which suggests that the first two hours of instruction have the highest effect.
5
  
The productivity of classroom-hours might be different for different subjects. In order to check 
for such variation I estimate models based on the three possible samples that include only two of three 
subjects. The lower panel of Table 3 presents estimates based on the sample that pools the math and 
science test scores. The estimated effects of classroom-hours obtained from this sample is higher, 7.14, 
about 24% higher than the respective estimate obtained from pooling all three subjects together. 
However, pooling math and language test scores yields an estimate of 7.42 and pooling science and 
language yields an estimate of 4.27. This pattern does not permit me to conclude in which of the three 
subjects there is lower average productivity of instructional time in the OECD countries. However, the 
average (6.28) of the three estimates obtained from three samples that include only two of the three 
subjects is very close to the estimate (5.76) obtained by pooling all three subjects.
  
 
 Robustness of main results and checks for threats of identification 
In this section, I present a set of robustness checks and alternative specifications that support the 
causal interpretation of the findings reported in column 2 of Table 3. Since the variation in hours of 
instruction is at the school level, the first check of robustness is estimates based on a sample of schools 
instead of pupils. I present these results in online appendix Table A5. I obtain the variables that I use in 
this estimation by collapsing the pupils’ data to the school level respective means. The pattern of 
estimates in this table is very similar to those presented in column 2 of Table 3. The OLS estimates in the 
two tables are practically identical while the school fixed effect estimates based on the school level 
sample are slightly lower than the estimates based on students micro data. The estimate based on all three 
subjects is lower by 17 percent than the respective estimate in Table 3, the estimate based on math, and 
science only is lower by 9 percent than the respective estimate in Table 3.  
  Next I also examined how sensitive the treatment estimates are to including interactions between 
the subject dummies and pupil’s characteristics. The treatments estimates from this more flexible   
5 For the range of 4+, it is impossible to compute the exact effect per hour because it is an open-ended range and 
the mean is not known, therefore, I assume arbitrarily a mean of 5 hours.  13  
  
specification (not shown here and available from the author) are very similar to those presented in Table 
3 though overall they are about 10 percent lower.  
  The first robustness check of whether the evidence in column 2 Table 3 is reflecting some 
subject specific selection and sorting in some schools is based on the data available from the PISA 
school questionnaire question 19 about how much consideration is given in the admission decisions to 
student’s academic record and whether placements tests are used in this process (see the exact wording 
of the question in the online appendix). I expect that the validity of the identification strategy not be 
sensitive to endogenous sorting and selection in a sample of schools that do not pay any attention to 
previous academic records of its applicants and that do not use any admission exams. In columns 3-4 of 
Table 3, I report results from such a sample of schools and in columns 5-6, I report estimates based on a 
sample of schools that consider student’s academic record for admission. The sample of students in 
schools where past academic achievements are irrelevant for admission is the largest and it includes 
about two thirds of the whole sample. The estimates from this sample are only marginally different from 
those obtained from full sample: the OLS estimates is lower, 16.97 versus 19.58, and pupil fixed effect 
estimate is higher, 6.008 versus 5.76. The OLS and the pupil fixed effect estimates in columns 5-6 are 
also only marginally higher than the estimates obtained from the full sample and reported in columns 1-2 
of Table 3. The estimate based on the sample of schools that admit pupils based on their academic record 
yields lower estimates, but they are not statistically different from the respective estimates presented in 
any of the columns of Table 3. I also estimated the effect of hours of instruction based on a sample of 
schools that do not used as a criterion for admission student’s desire for a particular program. This 
information is also based on the PISA school questionnaire question 19. The results based on this sample 
are very similar those obtained from the full sample. 
Another potential source of selection bias is tracking pupils to classes within schools according 
to their ability because one can expect that schools that practice such tracking will also tend to select and 
admit pupils based on subject specific strengths. If the strengths or specializations of schools are 
correlated with hours of instruction in different subjects, it will lead to a bias in the estimated effect of 
hours of instruction. In Table 4, I present results for three different samples distinguished by schools’ 
tracking policy (see the exact wording of the question in the online appendix). Columns 1-2 present 
estimates for a sample of schools that practice tracking at the class level, namely they group their 
students in classes according to their ability. In columns 3-4, I report results based on a sample of schools 
that track pupils to different ability study groups within classes. In columns 5-6 I report results based on 
a sample of schools that do not practice any form of pupil’s tacking. The OLS and the pupil fixed effect 
estimates in the first row in columns 1-2 are quite similar to the respective estimates presented in 14  
  
columns 3-4. They are marginally higher than the estimates obtained from the full sample and reported in 
columns 1-2 of Table 3. The sample of schools that track pupils into different classes by ability yields 
estimates that are higher by 15 percent than the respective estimates in Table 3 and the sample of schools 
that practice within class tracking yields estimates that are higher by 7 percent of the estimates in Table 
3. However, in both cases these estimates are not different significantly from the point estimates obtained 
from the full sample as the confidence intervals of the latter estimates include the point estimates 
obtained from each of these samples. Finally, the effect of instruction hours on test scores in schools that 
practice no tracking at all is 5.17, not significantly different from the estimate from the full sample (5.76) 
but significantly lower than the estimates obtained for schools which practice tracking between classes.  
Another potential source of bias can originate from the inclusion of private schools in the PISA 
sample. For example, 18 percents of the schools in the OECD sample are classified as private. This could 
be of concern because admission based on previous academic record and on additional exams as well as 
tracking pupils to study groups by ability is much more prevalent among private schools. To assess these 
concerns I therefore estimated the effect of instruction hours based on a sample that included only the 
public schools in the PISA sample. The estimated effect of instruction school hours based on pooling 
together the math, science and language test scores is 6.09 (sd=0.428), just barely higher than the 
estimate from a sample that included also the private schools. The estimate based on just math and 
science is 7.501 (sd=0.643), only marginally higher than the 7.14 (sd=0.55) obtained from the full 
sample. 
Overall, based on the evidence presented in Table 3 and 4 and the results from a sample that 
includes only public schools, it is apparent that potential selection and sorting of students based on 
subject specific considerations related to selective admission or tracking pupils in classes by abilities is  
not  driving the results. This is an important result because it is expected that schools that admit pupils 
based on academic record or that track students by ability will also tend to select and admit pupils based 
on subject specific strengths. If the strength or specialization of schools is also correlated with hours of 
instruction in different subjects, it might bias the estimates of the effect of hours of instruction. For 
example, certain schools may come to be known as “math-oriented” or “literature-oriented”. The more 
effective teachers in each of these areas may sort into the schools that emphasize them –perhaps because 
they like teaching students motivated in their subjects, or because they feel it is more prestigious to be 
the math teacher in the math-oriented school than in a the literature-oriented schools. If these schools will 
add more hours of instructions to their favorite subject of orientation than teachers’ quality will confound 
the effect of instruction time. Since such schools almost always select their students based on subject 
specific (school orientation) ability and motivation and often also use tracking, the robustness of the 15  
  
evidence presented above with respect to patterns of admission and selection of students based on 
academic ability is especially reassuring that the effect of instruction time that I estimate is not capturing 
other effects such as teachers’ quality. 
The lack of any large discernable differences in the effect of hours of instruction by admission or 
tracking policies of schools suggests that unobservables that are correlated with sorting or selection of 
pupils based on subject specific hours of instruction consideration are not biasing our estimates. Table 5 
provides further evidence that support this conclusion. First, I add to the regressions as control variables 
indicators of whether the school offers a special study program in science or math which may attract 
students with special interest and ability in science and math. The first set of controls is based on 
question 20 in the PISA school questionnaire. It consists of indicators for school activities that promote 
engagement with science among students (science clubs, science fairs, science competitions, 
extracurricular science projects and excursions and field trips). The second set is based on question 22 in 
the PISA school questionnaire. It consists of indicators of school programs such as trips to museums, 
trips to science and technology centers, and extracurricular environmental projects and lectures and 
seminars with guest speakers, all of which provide opportunities for students to learn about science and 
environmental topics. The motivation for including these control variables is that they most likely will 
eliminate a potential bias in the estimated effect of hours of instruction due to selection or sorting of 
students to schools based on special abilities and interest in science and math. These results are presented 
in column 1 and 2 of Table 5. Note that the OLS (column 1) and fixed effects (column 2) estimates, are 
almost identical to the respective estimates presented in columns 1-2 of Table 3, suggesting that the fact 
that many schools offer special programs and activities in science and math a are not source of concern 
that our estimates are biased due to subject specific sorting and selection. 
Another robustness check of our evidence is based on the data available in PISA (school 
questionnaire question 14) about lack of qualified teachers for each of the following subjects: science, 
mathematics, language, and other subjects. I have added a control variable for whether the school’s 
capacity to provide instruction in a given subject is hindered by a lack of qualified teachers in that 
subject. The  rationale for adding this control is that schools that specialize and have a particular strength 
in a given subject will be less likely to have difficulties in hiring qualified teachers. The OLS and pupil 
fixed effect estimates are presented in columns 3 and 4, respectively, of Table 5 and they are almost 
identical to those presented in columns 1-2 of Table 3. I also estimate the various models in various 
samples stratified by the extent of lack of qualified teachers, for example including only schools that 
report lack of qualified teachers in at least two subjects or a sample that includes only schools without 16  
  
lack of qualified teachers in any subject. The results obtained from these samples are practically 
identical.  
 
 Heterogeneous treatment effects 
To gain further insights into the effect of instructional time, I explore heterogeneous effects of 
classroom hours for different sub-samples. In Table 6, I report separate estimates for boys and for girls. 
The estimates show a positive impact of instructional time for both genders but the effect is marginally 
higher (by 13%) for girls than for boys but this difference is not significantly different from zero. A 
somewhat lower gender difference in the effect of instructional time is observed when only math and 
science test scores are pooled jointly in the estimation. This pattern may suggest that the gender related 
difference in marginal productivity of instructional time is due to the marginally lower effect of language 
classes on boys language proficiency than on girls. The pattern of the non-linear effect further suggests 
that most of this gender difference comes from the higher effect of 4+ hours on girls than on boys. 
In Table 7, I report results for two sub-samples stratified by the average years of schooling of 
both parents and for two sub-samples of immigrants, first generation and second generation. The 
productivity of instructional time is clearly higher (35%) for pupils from low education families. 
However, again this differential productivity does not exist when only math and science are used in the 
estimation, which  suggests that pupils from low education families benefit significantly more than other 
pupils from additional classroom instruction in language.  
Finally, an interesting pattern is seen in the estimated effect of instructional time for immigrants. 
Firstly, the estimates are marginally higher for first generation immigrants but they are much higher 
(30%) for second-generation immigrants. Secondly, these differences are even larger when these 
estimates are based on pooling in the estimation only math and science test scores. Instruction time in 
school is 69 percent more productive for second-generation immigrants in comparison to natives (an 
estimate of 11.99 versus 7.11). This suggests that the relative gain for an hour of instruction in language 
is much lower for second-generation immigrants than for natives.   
 Evidence from middle and low income countries  
The first row in Table 8 presents evidence based on a sample of the following middle-income 
countries, all former Soviet block: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The 
mean test scores of the three subjects in this sample are all lower than the respective means of the OECD 
developed countries: math - 472.4, science - 480.4, language - 458.3 (see Table A2 in the online 17  
  
                                                
appendix). The standard deviations in the pupil level distribution of test scores are similar to those in the 
OECD sample, 97.8 in math, 97.9 in science and 105.0 in language.  
The OLS estimates of the effect of instructional time are much higher in this sample than in 
OECD developed countries. The OLS estimate of the continuous hours of instruction variable is 38.2 
versus 19.58 in the OECD sample. However, the within pupil estimate is 6.07, almost identical to the 
respective OECD estimate. This suggests that the selection or endogeneity in school resources in the 
Eastern European countries are much more important. 
The estimate for girls is again higher (26%) than for boys and it is much higher (by 33%) for 
pupils from low education families. The higher effect of hours of instruction on second-generation 
immigrants is again evident as in the OECD sample. 
The lower panel in Table 8 presents estimates based on a sample of developing countries 
(Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Thailand, and 
Tunisia).
6 These four countries are among the best performing countries among all participants in PISA 
2006 and their mean instructional time in all three subjects are also among the highest in the overall 
sample. The mean test scores in this sample of developing countries are 21% lower than in the OECD 
countries: math – 398.5, science - 403.4, language – 397.1. The standard deviation in the pupil level 
distribution of test scores is around 100 in the three subjects. 
The estimates show a much lower productivity of instructional time than the estimates of the 
OECD or the middle-income Eastern European countries. The effect of a change of one classroom hour 
is only 2.99 points which is equal to 0.06 of the within pupil standard deviation and 0.04 of the between 
standard deviation. This effect size is about half the effect size estimated for the OECD developed 
economies and for the Eastern Europe sample. The gap is even larger based on a comparison of the 
estimates derived from pooling only math and science test scores. The largest difference in terms of the 
non-linear specification of instructional hours between the two groups of countries is in the effect of 
changing from less than two hours to 2-3 hours of instruction per week.  
Overall, instructional time in the sample of the developing countries is much more effective in 
improving test scores of girls (38% higher than for boys) and of immigrants. However, in this sample the 
effect of instructional time is lower by 26% for pupils from low education families than for pupils from 
educated families.  
The results from the samples of rich and poor countries can be used to compute what proportion 
of the gap in knowledge between these sets of countries can be explained or eliminated by bridging the 
 
6 I do not include in this sample the new industrialized countries of Korea, Honk Kong, Macau and Chinese Taipei 
because their income per capita is much higher than the developing countries and in the PISA classification they are 
not included in the sample of the developing countries. 18  
  
                                                
gap in instructional time and in its productivity in the different subjects.  The mean instructional time in 
math, science and language in the rich countries are 3.5, 3.1 and 3.5 while in the poor countries they are 
3.5, 3.0 and 3.2. The gap in instructional time is relatively small, 0% in math, 14% in science and 9% in 
language. The mean test scores in the developing countries sample are much lower: 398.5 in math, 403.4 
in science, and 397.1 in language. Therefore, the gap in mean test scores between the developing and the 
OECD developed countries is very large, over 20% and its size is about one standard deviation in each of 
the subjects. Obviously, equalizing the instructional time in the poor countries to the level in rich 
countries will not significantly eliminate the test score gap between these two parts of the world. 
However, the poor countries can reduce this gap by raising the marginal productivity of instructional 
time to the level in rich countries. The average instructional time in the three subjects in the developing 
countries sample is 3.2. Converging to the productivity of instructional time in the OECD countries will 
therefore raise achievements in each of the three subjects by 0.10 of a standard deviation. In section 5, I 
will explore what structural changes in the education system in developing countries can lead to 
convergence of the productivity of instructional time to the level in the OECD countries. 
 
Evidence from Primary and Middle Schools in Israel  
             Using Within Student between Subject Variation in Instructional time  
Data for elementary and middle schools is based on the GEMS (Growth and Effectiveness 
Measures for Schools - Meizav in Hebrew) datasets for the years 2002-2005. The GEMS includes a 
series of tests and questionnaires administered by the Division of Evaluation and Measurement of the 
Ministry of Education.
7 The GEMS is administered at the midterm of each school year to a 
representative 1-in-2 sample of all elementary and middle schools in Israel, so that each school 
participates in GEMS once every two years. The GEMS student data include test scores of fifth and 
eighth graders in math, science, Hebrew, and English. In principle, all students except those in special 
education classes are tested and the proportion of students who are tested is above 90 percent. The raw 
test scores used a 1-to-100 scale that I transform into z-scores to facilitate interpretation of the results.  
  The test scores for the years 2002-2005 are linked to student administrative records collected by 
the Israel Ministry of Education. The administrative records include student demographics that I use to 
construct all measures of students’ background characteristics. Using the linked datasets, I build a panel 
for elementary schools and a panel for middle schools. I drop any schools with an annual enrollment 
lower than 10 students from the panel. The elementary school panel includes data for 5
th grade student 
 
7 The GEMS are not administered for school accountability purposes and only aggregated results at the district 
level are published. For more information on the GEMS see the Division of Evaluation and Measurement website 
(in Hebrew): http://cms.education.gov.il/educationcms/units/rama/odotrama/odot.htm.  19  
  
test scores for the years 2002-2005. The sample is restricted to Jewish public schools that have mixed-
gender classes. There are 939 elementary schools with test score data. As every school is sampled once 
in two years, we have two observations of the same school and grade for more than 90 percent of the 
schools. The middle school panel includes 8
th-grade student test scores for the years 2002-2005. The 
sample is restricted to Jewish middle schools. There are 475 schools in the sample, of which 85 percent 
appear in two years. As there are multiple years for each school, I pool all years and exploit within 
student variation in instructional time across years.  
  The GEMS also includes interviews with all teachers and the school principal. The questionnaire 
for home teachers of all classes included questions about classroom instruction time in each subject and 
the total per week. I use teachers’ responses to these items to compute the school average for 5
th and 8
th 
grade instructional time in each subject. The mean per grade is preferred over the class level measure to 
avoid selection due to within school and grade endogenous allocation of instructional time to various 
subjects. However, the mean at the grade is very highly correlated with the class level figure for 
classroom-hours of instruction.  
  Table 9 presents the estimates for instructional time in fifth grade (columns 1-3) and eighth grade 
(columns 4-6). Three different specifications are used. The first includes only year fixed effects, the 
second adds pupil demographic controls and the third adds school fixed effects. All the 5
th grade 
estimates are positive and most are significantly different from zero. Some of the 8
th grade estimates are 
negative and many are not significantly different from zero.  
Table 10 presents estimates of the effect of instructional time from a sample that pools all or sub 
sets of the three subjects, for 5
th and 8
th grades. The first row of the table presents the OLS estimates 
(with controls for year effects, student's characteristics and school fixed effects) and the third row 
presents the estimates based on student fixed effects. The estimate based on within student variation 
across all three subjects (column 4) is 0.058 for fifth and 0.029 for 8
th grade (column 8). The OLS 
estimates are larger for both grades but these differences are not nearly as large as we saw in the PISA 
sample, most likely because there is not much selection in allocation of instruction time to primary and 
middle schools in Israel.  
The other columns in the Table 10 present estimates based on samples that pool at a time only 
two of the subjects. In 5
th grade, all of these estimates are about equal to the estimate based on a sample 
that pooled test scores of all three subjects. The estimates from the 8
th grade sample are smaller, being 20  
  
                                                
similar in the two set of pairs (math and science and math and English) but much lower in the third pair 
science and English.
8
In Table 10 I also report estimates based on sub groups, first for male and female, and secondly 
for pupils from low and high education families. Unlike the evidence from the PISA sample, there is no 
systematic pattern of differences in the estimated effect of instructional time between boys and girls. 
Also unlike the PISA OECD estimates, in the Israeli results there is some evidence that pupils from 
higher education families have a higher productivity of school instructional time. 
               Using Pupil’s Longitudinal Data and within Subject Variation in Instructional Time 
The structure of the GEMS allows me to follow a sample of students from elementary schools at 
5
th grade in 2002 to middle schools at 8
th grade in 2005).
9 I take advantage of this feature and construct a 
longitudinal dataset at the student level to examine how changes in students’ achievement in the three 
subjects are associated with changes in their instructional time (due to their transition from elementary 
school to middle school). I first estimate the following first difference equation by differencing out two 
relationships like equation (1) for each student (one for middle school and one for elementary school):  
 Aijmk − Aijpk  = μi + γ (Hijmk − Hijpk) + β Xij + δ S j + (ε j +ηk ) + uijk    (2) 
where p denotes primary school and m denotes middle school. A student fixed effect is differenced out 
from this equation. However, I attempted specifications that included as controls the students’ 
background characteristics, the average characteristics of their cohort in elementary and middle school, a 
grade fixed effect, a fixed effect for all students who attended the same primary school and a fixed effect 
for all students who attend the same middle school.
10 I therefore base the identification on contrasting the 
change in hours of instruction in each subject across elementary and middle school, and within students.   
Table 11 presents estimates of γ of equation (2). I actually estimated this parameter using a 
model that pools a panel data the 5
th and 8
th grade information for every pupil and including student fixed 
effect as a control. This model yields exactly the same point estimates at equation (2) and it has an 
advantage of estimating the correct standard errors. I estimate this model for each subject separately and 
for the pool of all test scores. The estimated effect of instructional time is positive and significant in 
math, science and it is positive in English as well but it is not precisely measured. The highest estimate is 
 
8 The lower productivity of instruction time in middle school in Israel is consistent with the view that this part of the 
schooling cycle is the weakest link in the school system and there are discussions and recommendations to abolish it 
and make the 6-8 grades an integral part of secondary schools. 
9 I link only a fourth of the students because except the large cities almost all other localities were sampled once 
every two years.  
10 The results are virtually identical when these controls are omitted from the regression. They are also qualitatively 
unchanged when I simply include a separate fixed effect for each primary and each middle school. 21  
  
in math and the lowest in English. The estimated effect of instructional time obtained from a sample of 
all subjects together is 0.036, which is larger than the estimate that is reported in Table 10 (0.029) for 8
th 
grade and smaller than the estimate for 5
th grade (0.058) reported in Table 9. It is also higher than the 
average of the two, which is 0.043 and also lower than the estimate that I obtained from the sample of all 
the developed OECD countries but we have to note that the later estimate is for ninth and tenth grade 
students.  
As an alternative to the difference specification (equation 2), I also estimated the following value 
added model with a very flexible specification: 
   Aijmk = μi + γ Hijmk  + β Xij + δ S j + λ aiq +  θ aiq(1) + σ aiq(2) + uijk     (3) 
where now aiq represents same-subject test score in 5
th grade, aiq(1 and aiq(2) are the two cross-subjects test 
scores in 5
th grade, and λ, θ and σ are (vectors of) subject-specific parameters that capture the effects of 
5
th grade test scores in the same- and cross-subjects. The parameter estimates of the effect of hours of 
instruction on test score in 8
th grade are very similar to those reported above and therefore are not 
reported here. 
 
5           Correlates of Productivity Differences of Instructional Time across Countries  
The productivity of instructional time is endogenous and a variety of factors can affect it. For 
example, the quantity and quality of other school inputs, teachers’ education and training, class size, 
computers, science labs and so on. All of these inputs might interact with learning hours and shape the 
productivity of instructional time in school. Similarly, various structural features of the education system 
may affect the productivity of instructional time by affecting teachers and school principals’ effort and 
efficiency. For example, accountability measures, such as publishing school league tables based on 
national tests or using pupils’ performance measures to determine school staff compensation. Another 
relevant structural characteristic of the education system is the degree of autonomy that schools have in 
hiring and dismissing teachers. We can presume that more flexibility in staffing decision might lead to a 
better match between teachers and schools and create an environment that induces more effort and 
responsibility among school staff. The survey of school head masters in PISA 2006 provides information 
on a few aspects and characteristics of the education system of the dimensions discussed above. In this 
section, I use several indices or indicators of these characteristics that PISA 2006 produced in a 
comparable manner for all the countries in the sample. I use here the OECD sample because it is the 
largest in terms of number of countries and schools in the sample and because it exhibit relatively large 
variation in structure and characteristics of schools.  22  
  
The first set of characteristics includes three binary indicators of school accountability measures: 
whether achievements data are posted publicly, whether achievements data are used in evaluation of 
school principal performance, and whether achievements data are used in evaluation of teachers' 
performance. Next is a PISA index that ranks the school's quality of educational resources, which is 
based on teachers’ qualifications, class size and the quality of other school inputs. Two additional indices 
measure the degree of school autonomy. The first measures the school’s autonomy in resource 
allocation: hiring and firing teachers, determining teachers’ starting and change in salaries, determining 
and allocating the budget. The second index measures the school’s responsibility for curriculum and 
assessment: school independence in deciding on the courses offered and their content, textbook used, and 
method of assessing pupils’ performance.  
Because these indices are the same in each school for all subjects, their main effect cannot be 
included as covariates in a regression that includes a school fixed effect. However, the interactions of 
these indices with instructional time can be included in the within pupil regression of achievement. Note 
that the pupil fixed effect absorbs the school fixed effect and therefore it also controls for any school 
level factor that is correlated with or determines these indices. In other words, even if the distribution of 
these indices across schools  is not random, the school fixed effect will control for such heterogeneity. 
Therefore, the identifying assumption for the effect of the interaction between the indices and the hours 
of instruction is that the heterogeneity in these indices across schools is not subject specific.  
Table 12 presents the estimated coefficients from these regressions. The first column presents the 
means of the indicators or indices. Accountability is not widespread among OECD countries as only 33.5 
percent of the schools post their mean achievement publicly, and even fewer use them to evaluate school 
principals (22%) or teachers (29%). The means of the other indices are less interpretable. 
In column 2 and 3 of Table 12, I present the estimates of the main effect of instructional hours 
and the estimates of the interaction of instructional hours and each of the school level indices. I include 
the interactions one at a time so each pair of estimates comes from a different regression. The estimated 
main effect of instruction hours is always positive and significant and it does not vary very much across 
the different regressions and from the estimate presented in Table 3. Three of the six estimated effects of 
the interaction terms are significantly different from zero. The same three remain significantly different 
from zero and their point estimate did not change much when I included all the interactions 
simultaneously in the regression. These results, shown in column 4 of Table 12, suggest the multi-co-
linearity among the various indices does not prevent the estimation of  the unique effect of each  index.  
The overall pattern is that the productivity of instructional time is higher in schools that 
implement school accountability measures, and in schools that have a degree of independence in 23  
  
allocating their resources. The index of quality of educational resources has a positive coefficient but it is 
not precisely measured. On the other hand, school flexibility in determining its curriculum and pupils’ 
assessment measures do not have a significant effect on the productivity of instruction hours. Note that 
this index has  no significant effect even when entered the regression as the sole interaction with hours of 
instruction. But I should emphasize that the main effect on pupils’ achievement of school pedagogical 
autonomy, can still be positive even though it does not vary with hours of instruction across the three 
subjects measured in PISA. 
The main effect of instructional time in the regression when all indices are included 
simultaneously is 4.676. In schools that post the achievements of their students publicly, this estimate is 
6.64, over 40 percent higher. A similar large effect is evident in schools that evaluate school principals 
according to their students’ performance though no such effect is evident in schools that similarly 
evaluate their teachers. However, the  2006 PISA questionnaire data does not provide enough details to 
allow an understanding of how exactly such an evaluation is done and whether it is used to reward school 
staff or affect their wages so we should be cautious in interpreting these results.  
Another interesting feature of the school structure in PISA 2006 is governance, in particular the 
role of the school governing board. Four questions allow the measurement of  the role of the governing 
board in influencing staffing, the budget, and instructional content and assessment. Adding to the 
regression interactions terms between these four measures (indicators) and instructional hours did not 
change at all the point estimates of the already included interaction terms. However, the pattern of the 
estimates of these new interaction terms is interesting since it is consistent with the evidence of the other 
interaction terms. First, having a board that affect staffing and the budget leads to higher productivity of 
instructional time. Second, having a board that influence instructional content and assessment has no 
measurable effect on the productivity of instruction in school. This evidence, which  is presented in 
column 5 of Table 12, strengthens the overall findings that school autonomy in personal and budgetary 
issues is conducive to enhance pupils’ learning and achievement while there is no parallel evidence with 
respect to school pedagogic autonomy. 
 
6           Conclusions 
In this paper, I measure empirically the effects of instructional time on students’ academic 
achievement. The evidence from a sample of 15 year olds from over fifty countries and from a sample of 
10 and 13 year olds in Israel consistently show that instructional time has a positive and significant effect 
on test scores. The OLS results are highly biased upward but the within student estimates are very similar 
across groups of developed and middle-income countries and age groups. The effect of instructional time 24  
  
                                                
can be considered moderate or even large relative to other school level interventions for which we have 
reliable evidence. In the OECD sample, one additional hour of instruction increases on average test 
scores by about 0.15 of the within pupil standard deviation in test scores and by about 0.07 standard 
deviation of the between pupil standard deviation. Of course, a judgment on the merit of enhancing 
instructional time should also take into account the cost of adding instructional time relative to the cost 
of increasing the level of other inputs or of other interventions. Another related policy aspect is that 
change in instructional time in a given subject might be associated with a change in coursework. For 
example, if high school students from a different country/school study math twice as much time from 
students from a different country/school, this could mean that they are perhaps more likely for example 
to cover Algebra rather than just Geometry. Such an increase in coursework might have increased 
performance in PISA along with the effect through more time devoted to subjects covered by students 
who are exposed to less instruction time in math. The PISA data does now allow disentangling these two 
channels of effect of change in instruction time.
 11   
The estimated effect of instructional time is much lower in the sample of developing countries 
that participated in PISA 2006. The estimated effect of instructional time in this sample is only half of 
the effect size in the developed countries. The developing countries included in the PISA sample, for 
example Chile, Argentina or Thailand, are much more developed than the ‘typical’ developing country. 
Given the recent evidence from India, Kenya and other very poor developing countries about the high 
rate of  absenteeism of teachers from work, we can expect that the productivity of instructional time in 
the poorest developing counties in Africa and in South East Asia is even lower than in our sample of 
developing countries. In these countries, we can expect to have much more scope for improvement by 
closing the gap in productivity of instructional time relative to the OECD. 
The significant association between structural characteristics of the education system and the 
work environment of teachers in OECD countries and the average productivity of instructional time 
points to  directions of how productivity can be improved in developed and in poorer countries. 
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All Subjects 3.38 (1.48) 13.16 40.43 36.45 9.97
Math 3.53 (1.38) 8.72 39.54 43.14 8.60
Science 3.06 (1.57) 21.14 42.72 25.53 10.61
Reading 3.54 (1.44) 9.61 39.02 40.66 10.71
All Subjects 3.05 (1.56) 22.51 39.59 29.29 8.61
Math 3.30 (1.48) 15.36 38.97 37.59 8.08
Science 2.77 (1.68) 33.38 37.21 17.53 11.88
Reading 3.08 (1.45) 18.79 42.59 32.75 5.86
All Subjects 3.23 (1.71) 22.86 34.72 27.51 14.90
Math 3.48 (1.69) 18.72 30.73 34.06 16.50
Science 2.97 (1.74) 29.03 37.17 18.53 15.27
Reading 3.24 (1.65) 20.85 36.27 29.94 12.95
Table 1 - Means and Standard Deviations of Instructional Time in  OECD, Eastern European, and 
Developing Countries
Panel C: 13 Developing Countries
Notes: The first column shows the mean of instruction time per week and the second column presents the
respective standard deviations. The thrid to sixth columns presents the proportion of pupils by the amount of
weekly hours of instruction time. The sample in panel A includes 22 OECD developed countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Panel B
includes 14 countries of Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. Panel C includes 13
developing countries: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
 Proportion of pupils by weekly instruction time
Panel A: 22 OECD Countries
Panel B: 14 Eastern European Countries
27(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
I. Continuous Hours:
21.69 27.98 24.45 26.24 38.36 33.92 4.56 15.43 12.48
(1.03) (1.19) (1.10) (0.80) (0.90) (0.85) (1.00) (1.32) (1.19)
II. Categorical Hours:
40.92 47.97 43.03 44.67 53.70 48.48 49.25 50.73 42.20
(8.16) (7.32) (6.67) (2.63) (2.82) (2.54) (10.38) (8.54) (7.66)
63.73 70.11 61.89 77.11 90.48 80.40 55.69 64.88 53.41
(8.21) (7.41) (6.76) (2.98) (3.24) (2.96) (10.42) (8.67) (7.79)
Country dummies P P P P P P
Individual characteristics P P P




4 Hours + 
Notes: The table shows OLS regression estimates of student test scores on hours of school instruction in a particular subject. In the first regression hours of instruction is a
continuous variable. In the second regression hours enters the regression as binary variables for a particular number of hours learned per subject per week. The base (omitted)
category is 1 hour. Controls on individual characteristics include binary variables for gender, fathers' and mothers' education and immigrant status. The sample includes 22
OECD developed countries (see notes to Table 1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level. Each regression contains 137 083 observations.
28(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regression I. 
19.58 5.76 16.97 6.01 21.08 6.21
(0.72) (0.37) (0.86) (0.50) (1.73) (0.89)
Regression II. 
46.90 6.30 43.18 7.53 55.59 6.54
(2.65) (1.09) (3.78) (1.62) (5.66) (2.38)
67.88 12.42 62.71 14.08 73.69 13.10
(2.88) (1.28) (3.99) (1.78) (6.03) (2.83)
Number of students
Regression I. 
25.48 7.14 21.84 8.60 27.56 7.57
(0.73) (0.55) (0.88) (0.75) (1.79) (1.33)
Regression II. 
45.65 9.38 40.13 10.81 55.19 12.17
(2.58) (1.52) (3.49) (2.57) (5.06) (3.43)
73.87 16.96 65.72 20.71 80.47 18.66
(2.82) (1.81) (3.70) (2.84) (5.58) (4.07)
Number of students
4 Hours + 
307,156 177,846 57,580
Notes: The table shows OLS and FE regressions of student scores on hours of instruction in a particular subject.
Fixed effects are at the student level. Each regression also includes subject fixed effects. In the first regression hours
of instruction is measured a continuous variable. In the second regression hours enters the regression as binary
variables for a particular number of hours learned per subject per week. The base (omitted) category is 1 hour. The
sample includes 22 OECD developed countries (see notes to Table 1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the school level.
460,734 266,769 86,370






A. Mathematics + Science + Reading
Hours of instruction
2-3 Hours 
4 Hours + 
Sample Divided by School Admission Policy
Table 3 - Estimated Effect of Instructional Time on Test Scores, OECD Sample
Whole Sample









29(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
19.88 6.61 19.01 6.17 20.02 5.17
(1.05) (0.53) (1.00) (0.56) (1.36) (0.68)
41.26 10.99 39.23 6.88 58.78 3.93
(4.15) (1.63) (3.87) (1.76) (4.80) (1.76)
63.62 16.12 59.48 13.45 78.40 9.82
(4.41) (1.78) (4.08) (1.98) (5.35) (2.23)
Number of students
22.01 10.13 24.06 8.58 30.14 3.36
(1.01) (0.73) (1.02) (0.82) (1.45) (1.05)
39.21 17.67 37.31 10.81 58.11 3.30
(3.91) (2.23) (3.62) (2.50) (4.85) (2.29)
64.40 26.93 64.41 20.11 89.27 5.86
(4.15) (2.44) (3.84) (2.86) (5.48) (3.01)
Number of students





by School Tracking Policy
OLS


















Notes: Table 4 replicates Table 3 in samples defined by tracking status - whether the school
tracks students by classes, within classes, or not at all. The table shows OLS and FE
regressions of student scores on hours of instruction in a particular subject. Fixed effects are at
the student level. Each regression also includes subject fixed effects. In the first regression
hours of learning is a continuous variable. In the second regression hours enters the regression
as binary variables for a particular number of hours learned per subject per week. The base
(omitted) category is 1 hour. The sample includes 22 OECD developed countries (see notes to




A. Mathematics + Science + Reading
30(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression I. 
18.37 5.59 19.58 5.75
(0.73) (0.39) (0.72) (0.37)
Regression II. 
42.67 5.94 46.79 6.27
(2.67) (1.09) (2.65) (1.09)
62.59 14.73 67.70 12.38
(2.91) (1.29) (2.87) (1.27)
Number of students
Regression I. 
24.10 6.65 25.47 7.08
(0.75) (0.55) (0.73) (0.55)
Regression II. 
41.31 8.28 45.54 9.21
(2.58) (1.51) (2.58) (1.51)
67.87 15.19 73.72 16.75




Notes: The table shows OLS and FE regressions of student scores on hours of instruction in
a particular subject. Fixed effects are at the student level. Each regression also includes
subject fixed effects. In the first regression hours of instruction is a continuous variable. In
the second regression hours enters the regression as binary variables for a particular number
of hours learned per subject per week. The base (omitted) category is 1 hour. The sample
includes 22 OECD developed countries (see notes to Table 1). Standard errors in







B. Mathematics + Science
Hours of instruction
A. Mathematics + Science + Reading
149,672
4 Hours + 
Student 
FE
4 Hours + 
Table 5 - Estimated Effects of Instruction Time on Test Scores, with Controls 
Included in the Regressions for Special Science Activities in School and for 
Scarcity of Teachers in Each Subject
Special Science School  
Activities




31(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression I. 
20.25 4.99 18.62 5.62
(0.86) (0.40) (0.77) (0.41)
Regression II. 
46.82 6.22 46.66 5.91
(3.09) (1.19) (2.85) (1.22)
67.86 11.20 67.16 12.13
(3.39) (1.37) (3.09) (1.40)
Number of students
Regression I. 
26.35 6.90 24.75 7.25
(0.86) (0.60) (0.80) (0.63)
Regression II. 
45.66 9.51 45.81 8.73
(2.87) (1.65) (2.87) (1.76)
74.42 16.48 73.73 16.92
(3.19) (1.93) (3.12) (2.09)
Number of students 149,672 157,484
Notes: The table shows OLS and FE regressions of student scores on hours of instruction in a particular
subject. Fixed effects are at the student level. Each regression also includes subject fixed effects. In the first
regression hours of instruction is a continuous variable. In the second regression hours enters the regression
as binary variables for a particular number of hours learned per subject per week. The base (omitted)
category is 1 hour. The sample includes 22 OECD developed countries (see notes to Table 1). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level.
Hours of instruction
2-3 Hours 
4 Hours + 
Hours of instruction
2-3 Hours 
A. Mathematics + Science + Reading
B. Mathematics + Science
4 Hours + 
224,508 236,226






32OLS Stud.FE OLS Stud.FE OLS Stud.FE OLS Stud.FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Regression I. 
19.64 4.83 17.85 6.54 39.90 6.37 37.62 7.62
(0.86) (0.42) (0.74) (0.44) (1.95) (0.88) (2.03) (0.95)
Regression II. 
47.70 5.44 43.65 6.77 61.42 9.44 60.64 6.97
(3.48) (1.28) (2.50) (1.22) (4.65) (2.14) (4.99) (2.31)
69.89 10.30 60.62 14.05 105.66 12.89 101.45 10.69
(3.69) (1.45) (2.79) (1.47) (5.83) (2.58) (6.04) (2.76)
Number of students
Regression I. 
24.67 7.11 24.06 7.14 47.17 8.76 42.05 11.99
(0.86) (0.63) (0.78) (0.61) (1.96) (1.26) (1.98) (1.38)
Regression II. 
47.44 9.49 41.79 9.16 60.23 10.15 61.20 13.56
(3.40) (1.82) (2.41) (1.64) (4.70) (3.12) (4.97) (3.33)
75.01 17.31 66.62 16.48 116.27 17.80 107.12 20.40
(3.60) (2.13) (2.73) (1.94) (6.09) (3.89) (6.07) (4.11)
Number of students









A. Mathematics + Science + Reading
Hours of instruction
2-3 Hours 
4 Hours + 
Hours of instruction
235,539 225,195 23,103




Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of instruction time on test scores for the following sub-samples: pupils
from high edcuation families, pupils from low education families, first generation immigrants, and second generation
immigrants. Fixed effects are at the student level. Each regression also includes subject fixed effects. In the first
regression hours of instruction is a continuous variable. In the second regression hours enters the regression as binary
variables for a particular number of hours learned per subject per week. The base (omitted) category is 1 hour. The
sample includes 22 OECD developed countries (see notes in Table 1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
the school level.












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
38.20 38.89 37.25 41.20 33.37 26.35 35.68
(1.28) (1.42) (1.38) (1.56) (1.25) (3.32) (2.70)
6.07 5.15 6.49 5.03 6.67 5.53 7.26
(0.56) (0.59) (0.59) (0.66) (0.62) (2.07) (1.88)
Number of students 177,015 84,612 92,403 78,006 99,009 3,525 5,604
36.60 38.17 35.24 43.27 29.64 58.13 51.54
(1.20) (1.36) (1.24) (1.38) (1.23) (5.34) (4.15)
2.99 2.39 3.29 3.41 2.60 18.59 11.11
(0.80) (0.87) (0.90) (0.94) (0.88) (4.65) (3.91)
Number of students 238,938 108,927 130,011 76,970 82,322 1,642 2,210
Notes: The table shows OLS and fixed effect regressions of scores on hours of instructional time for two samples. The first sample
includes the following 14 Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. The second sample includes the following 13
developing countries: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uruguay. 
Table 8 -  Estimates of Effect of Instructional Time on Test Scores, 







34OLS Controls School FE OLS Controls School FE
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math 0.075 0.104 0.037 0.099 0.129 0.030
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026)
Science 0.041 0.065 0.043 -0.018 0.004 -0.010
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022)
English 0.029 0.053 0.058 -0.014 0.026 -0.001
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024)
Included Controls:
Year Fixed-Effects P P P P P P
Individual Pupil Controls P P P P
School Fixed Effects P P
Number of schools 939 475
Number of students 110,544 104,729
Table 9 -  Estimates of the Effect of Instructional Time on Test Scores in Israel
5th Grade 8th Grade
Notes: The table shows estimates of the effects of hours of instructional time on student scores, using Israeli
data from 2002 and 2005. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Individual controls include: a sex



















Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.075 0.082 0.058 0.071 0.037 0.090 0.010 0.036
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)
0.055 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.041 0.036 0.015 0.029
(0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.009)
0.076 0.085 0.061 0.073 0.037 0.086 0.008 0.034
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011)
0.055 0.059 0.062 0.059 0.038 0.035 0.013 0.026
(0.010) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.026) (0.017) (0.011)
0.074 0.080 0.054 0.068 0.038 0.091 0.012 0.037
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011)
0.056 0.059 0.057 0.057 0.044 0.034 0.017 0.031
(0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.027) (0.015) (0.010)
0.090 0.093 0.069 0.083 0.049 0.088 0.018 0.044
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010)
0.054 0.034 0.049 0.047 0.039 0.024 0.004 0.022
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) (0.029) (0.015) (0.010)
0.075 0.084 0.056 0.070 0.030 0.096 0.005 0.032
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012)
0.057 0.078 0.068 0.066 0.040 0.047 0.022 0.033












Notes: The table shows OLS and fixed effect regressions of scores on continuous hours of instructional time for the
Israeli data, using different subject combinations, for 5th and 8th grade. Estimates include subject and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Individual controls include: a sex dummy, both parents' years
of schooling, number of siblings, immigration status and ethnic origin.
All OLS 
FE




5th Grade 8th Grade
FE








0.086 0.074 0.013 0.026 0.036
(0.019) (0.015) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004)
0.095 0.050 0.031 0.032 0.041
(0.030) (0.023) (0.037) (0.006) (0.006)
0.080 0.097 0.000 0.021 0.032
(0.025) (0.020) (0.032) (0.005) (0.005)
0.067 0.046 -0.019 0.028 0.026
(0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.005) (0.006)
0.093 0.080 0.040 0.028 0.043
(0.029) (0.024) (0.041) (0.006) (0.006)
Descriptive Statistics:
Mean change in hours 1.156 3.765 1.749 -0.690 -0.690
SD of change in hours (2.176) (2.715) (1.512) (3.438) (3.438)
Number of schools 686 686 686 686 686
Number of students 4822 4822 4822 4822 4822
Notes: This table estimates the effect of continuous hours on scores, for each subject separately, and for all
subjects pooled together, using OLS and Student Fixed Effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
Individual controls include: a sex dummy, both parents' years of schooling, number of siblings, immigration
status and ethnic origin. Column 4 pools the samples from columns 1-3, and includes a subject fixed effect.




Table 11 - Pupil Fixed Effect Estimates of Instructional Time on Test Scores in Israel based on 
a Panel Data of Pupils Observed Both at 5th and 8th Grade in Israel.
Pupils with Higher 
Parental education
Pupils with Lower 
Parental education
37Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
.335 5.017 2.744 1.962 2.452
(.472) (.447) (.840) (.903) (.912)
.216 5.153 2.106 2.158 2.317
(.411) (.432) (.889) (1.135) (1.134)
.294 5.501 .345 -1.230 -.934
(.456) (.458) (.819) (1.015) (1.010)
.150 5.834 .099 .435 .442
(.989) (.395) (.393) (.399) (.400)
-.058 5.925 1.224 .842 .938
(.946) (.380) (.398) (.433) (.435)
.052 5.830 -.247 -.451 -.561
(.964) (.386) (.399) (.427) (.429)
.363 4.981 2.599 1.199
(.481) (.523) (.763) (.883)
.706 3.759 2.974 1.834
(.455) (.711) (.843) (.925)
.162 5.973 -.588 -.199
(.368) (.429) (.968) (1.069)
.219 6.018 -.837 -.802
(.413) (.464) (.831) (.922)
Hours Main Effect 4.676 3.255
(.713) (.964)
Table 12 -  Estimated Effects of School Characteristics Interacted with Instructional Hours, 
OECD Countries. 














Notes: This table looks into the effect of hours when it is interacted with various school characteristics (means shown in
column 1). The estimates presented in columns 2 and 3 are based on regressions when each characteristic enters the
regression separately. In columns 4 and 5 all characteristics are jointly included. Regressions include hours, interaction
between hours and the school characteristic, subject dummies, subject dummies interacted with school characteristics,
and pupil fixed effects. The sample includes 22 OECD developed countries that are listed in the notes of Table 3.
School Governing Board Influences Staffing 
(Binary Variable)
Achievement data are posted publicly (e.g. in the 
media). (Binary Variable)
Achievement data are used in evaluation of the 
principal's performance (Binary Variable)
Achievement data are used in evaluation of 





School Governing Board Influences Assessment 
(Binary Variable)
Quality of Educational Resources: Index, (Range -
3.45 to 2.1)
School Governing Board Influences Instructional 
Content (Binary Variable)
School Governing Board Influences Budget 
(Binary Variable) 
School Responsibility for Resource Allocation: 
Index, (Range -1.1 to 2.0) 
School Responsibility for Curriculum &  

























































































Tables Intended for an On Line Appendix  
46# Country Code Mathematics Science Reading All (sum) Mathematics Science Reading All (average)
1 Australia AUS 3.5 2.8 3.5 9.8 516.2 523.0 508.3 515.8 14,170
2 Austria AUT 2.8 2.2 2.4 7.4 509.3 513.8 494.0 505.7 4,927
3 Belgium BEL 3.2 2.3 3.1 8.6 526.9 516.2 506.9 516.6 8,857
4 Canada CAN 3.9 3.5 3.9 11.3 517.4 522.5 512.4 517.5 22,646
5 Switzerland CHE 3.5 2.0 3.4 8.9 527.8 507.6 496.2 510.5 12,192
6 Germany DEU 3.4 2.7 3.2 9.3 503.7 516.0 496.2 505.3 4,891
7 Denmark DNK 3.9 2.8 4.8 11.5 512.4 495.1 494.1 500.5 4,532
8 Spain ESP 3.1 2.8 3.2 9.1 501.4 504.4 479.7 495.2 19,604
9 Finland FIN 3.0 2.7 2.7 8.4 549.9 563.7 547.2 553.6 4,714
10 France FRA 3.4 2.5 3.6 9.5 497.0 496.1 488.6 493.9 4,716
11 United Kingdom GBR 3.4 3.7 3.4 10.5 497.5 514.3 496.0 502.6 13,152
12 Greece GRC 3.0 2.8 2.8 8.6 461.9 476.8 462.1 466.9 4,873
13 Ireland IRL 3.2 2.2 3.1 8.5 502.2 509.4 518.8 510.1 4,585
14 Iceland ISL 4.2 2.6 4.0 10.7 505.2 490.8 484.3 493.4 3,789
15 Italy ITA 3.2 2.5 3.9 9.6 473.8 487.2 477.4 479.4 21,773
16 Japan JPN 3.7 2.3 3.3 9.4 525.8 534.1 500.1 520.0 5,952
17 Luxembourg LUX 3.4 2.1 3.1 8.5 490.5 487.0 480.5 486.0 4,567
18 Netherlands NLD 2.5 2.0 2.5 7.1 537.2 530.4 513.8 527.1 4,871
19 Norway NOR 2.9 2.3 3.1 8.4 489.9 486.4 484.5 486.9 4,692
20 New Zealand NZL 3.9 3.6 3.9 11.4 523.0 532.3 523.3 526.2 4,823
21 Portugal PRT 3.2 2.9 2.8 8.9 470.2 478.7 476.6 475.2 5,109
22 Sweden SWE 2.6 2.4 2.7 7.7 503.3 504.3 508.5 505.4 4,443
Average 3.3 2.6 3.3 9.2 506.5 508.6 497.7 504.3 8358.1
Standard Deviation 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.3 21.5 21.1 19.0 19.6 6089.3
Total 183,878
Notes: The table shows, for each OECD country, average hours of instruction per week, for Mathematics, Science and Reading, and the total for all three subjects. Average 
Scores are also shown for these categories. 
Table A1 - Average Hours of Instructional Time and Pisa Scores, for OECD Countries
Hours of Instruction per week Pisa Score Number of 
Students
47# Country Code Mathematics Science Reading All (sum) Mathematics Science Reading All (average)
1 Bulgaria BGR 2.6 2.3 2.6 7.5 417.2 439.4 407.2 421.3 4,498
2 Czech Republic CZE 3.5 3.0 3.2 9.7 536.0 537.7 510.0 527.9 5,932
3 Estonia EST 3.7 2.9 3.1 9.7 517.2 534.5 502.9 518.2 4,865
4 Croatia HRV 2.7 1.8 2.9 7.3 467.3 493.3 477.1 479.2 5,213
5 Hungary HUN 2.9 2.2 2.8 7.9 496.7 508.9 488.4 498.0 4,490
6 Lithuania LTU 3.1 2.4 3.2 8.7 485.3 486.5 468.7 480.1 4,744
7 Latvia LVA 3.9 2.5 3.2 9.7 491.1 493.7 484.6 489.8 4,719
8 Montenegro MNE 2.7 2.5 2.6 7.8 395.2 408.8 387.8 397.3 4,455
9 Poland POL 3.9 2.4 4.1 10.4 500.3 503.0 512.7 505.3 5,547
10 Romania ROU 2.5 1.9 2.8 7.3 415.0 416.3 392.0 407.7 5,118
11 Russian Federation RUS 3.2 3.3 1.8 8.3 478.6 481.4 442.3 467.4 5,799
12 Serbia SRB 2.8 2.5 2.8 8.1 436.1 436.8 403.0 425.3 4,798
13 Slovak Republic SVK 2.9 2.2 2.7 7.8 494.7 491.1 470.2 485.3 4,731
14 Slovenia SVN 2.8 2.2 2.7 7.7 482.3 494.3 468.9 481.8 6,595
Average 3.1 2.4 2.9 8.4 472.4 480.4 458.3 470.3 5107.4
Standard Deviation 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.0 41.3 40.2 44.0 41.3 640.5
Total 71,504
Notes: The table shows, for 14 Eastern European countries, average hours of instruction per week, for Mathematics, Science and Reading, and the total for all three subjects. 
Average Scores are also shown for these categories. The sample includes 14 countries of Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia.
Table A2 -  Average Hours of Instructional Time and Pisa Scores, for Eastern European Countries
Hours of Instruction per week Pisa Score Number of 
Students
48# Country Code Mathematics Science Reading All (sum) Mathematics Science Reading All (average)
1 Argentina ARG 2.6 2.0 2.1 6.8 388.3 398.9 384.4 390.5 4,339
2 Azerbaijan AZE 3.3 2.5 3.2 9.0 476.6 385.3 355.2 405.7 5,184
3 Brazil BRA 2.7 2.0 2.6 7.3 365.8 385.5 389.9 380.4 9,295
4 Chile CHL 3.1 2.1 3.1 8.3 417.5 442.6 447.8 435.9 5,233
5 Columbia COL 3.7 3.0 3.4 10.2 373.5 391.5 390.9 385.3 4,478
6 Indonesia IDN 3.5 2.7 3.2 9.5 380.7 384.8 383.6 383.0 10,647
7 Jordan JOR 3.1 2.9 3.2 9.2 388.9 427.0 409.4 408.4 6,509
8 Kyrgyzstan KGZ 2.6 1.9 2.5 7.0 316.0 326.4 290.9 311.1 5,904
9 Mexico MEX 3.5 2.7 3.3 9.5 420.8 422.5 427.6 423.6 30,971
10 Thailand THA 3.4 3.4 2.7 9.5 425.2 430.0 425.3 426.8 6,192
11 Tunisia TUN 3.0 2.3 2.8 8.0 363.5 384.3 378.5 375.4 4,640
12 Turkey TUR 3.4 2.6 3.5 9.5 428.0 427.9 453.4 436.5 4,942
13 Uruguay URY 3.0 2.2 2.4 7.6 435.2 438.1 425.0 432.8 4,839
Average 3.1 2.5 2.9 8.6 398.5 403.4 397.1 399.7 7936.4
Standard Deviation 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.1 41.0 32.2 43.0 34.8 7177.6
Total 103,173
Notes: The table shows, for 13 Developing Countries, average hours of instruction per week, for Mathematics, Science and Reading, and the total for all three subjects. Average 
Scores are also shown for these categories. The sample includes 13 developing countries: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mexico, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay.  
Table A3 -  Average Hours of Instructional Time and Pisa Scores, for Developing Countries
Hours of Instruction per week Pisa Score Number of 
Students
49Mean 513.4 485.6 413.5 3.38 3.05 3.23
Standard Deviation 84.4 86.9 75.1 1.02 0.88 1.22
between pupils
Standard Deviation 38.8 40.9 46.7 1.08 1.28 1.19
within pupils
Notes: The table contains means, and the standard deviation within and between pupils, for 3 different samples: OECD countries, Eastern
Europe, and Developing Countries. 
Table A4 -  Descriptive Statistics - Test Score and Instructional Time  













50(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
20.28 4.80 19.45 4.18 20.13 5.11
(0.77) (0.48) (0.86) (0.52) (0.78) (0.45)
Number of Students
25.89 6.47 25.38 6.19 26.15 7.11
(0.80) (0.60) (0.88) (0.67) (0.81) (0.64)
Number of Students
Table A5 - Regressions of Test Scores on Instructional Time using School Level Means












Notes: These regressions are run using collapsed school level data. For example, hours refers to the mean of
continuous hours of learning, averaged to the school level. Fixed effects are at the student level. Hours of learning is
a continuous variable. The sample includes 22 OECD developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Each regression includes subject dummies,
and school fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school level.












Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.047 0.063 0.038 0.048
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
0.034 0.036 0.039 0.036
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
0.053 0.072 0.037 0.052
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
0.039 0.041 0.040 0.040
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
0.042 0.053 0.039 0.043
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
0.029 0.030 0.036 0.031
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
0.052 0.057 0.053 0.053
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
0.026 0.026 0.023 0.025
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
0.050 0.072 0.032 0.049
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
0.041 0.043 0.049 0.044
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
0.062 0.087 0.041 0.060
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
0.041 0.040 0.024 0.035
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006)
0.039 0.046 0.046 0.043
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
0.028 0.033 0.046 0.035
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005)
Table A6 -  Subject Combinations Estimates using OLS and Pupil Fixed 
Effects in Israel: Pooled 5th and 8th Grades
Notes: This table is a version of table 8, however using 5th and 8th grade pooled
together. The table shows OLS and fixed effect regressions of scores on continuous
hours of instructional time for the Israeli data, using different subject combinations.
Estimates include subject and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level. Individual controls include: a sex dummy, both parents' years of










Top Deciles OLS 
FE
Girls OLS 
FE
Higher 
Parental 
Education
OLS 
FE
All OLS 
FE
Boys OLS 
FE
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